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Abstract: 
  
The industry and trade policy regimes in India have witnessed drastic changes since 
1991. The dismantling of the industrial licensing system and thereby allowing free entry to and 
exit from the industry of firms in 1991 followed by the WTO induced trade liberalization leading 
to substantial reduction in tariffs and gradual softening of foreign investment regulations, 
particularly in the context of foreign direct investment since 1995, may have had significant 
impact on the state of competitiveness in India industries. In this paper an attempt has been made 
to evaluate the effects of trade and industrial policy changes on domestic competitiveness for 
select Indian industries during post-liberalization period. Though there exists a pool of empirical 
literature focusing on the state of competitiveness in India, the link between theoretical models 
underlying the empirical analysis is not often strong. Moreover, a section of the literature focuses 
on a combination of firm and industry data for drawing conclusions on firm behavior, which may 
not reflect the actual scenario. Given this background, the present paper attempts to provide a 
unified approach to examine the inter-relationships between entry and competitiveness within a 
consistent oligopolistic market framework. The empirical analysis of the present study, carried 
out on the basis of firm data for 14 sectors over 1990-2008, indicates that Indian industry have 
shown considerable changes over the last decade in terms of entry and competitiveness. An 
overall decline in concentration is witnessed between the two end points, which signify the 
importance of newer entry in the markets. The Price-Cost Margin however behaves differently for 
different sectors, which could be explained by the differing level of spillover of technical changes 
as a result of increased pressure of competition due to liberalization. Demand curve is generally 
found to be inelastic and declines over the period. The relationship between the size of the firms 
and their export volume turns out to be significantly positive. 
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Entry, Competitiveness and Exports: 
Evidence from Firm Level Data of Indian Manufacturing  
  
I.  Introduction: 
 
How does entry affect competitiveness in an industry and hence welfare? 
Conventional wisdom suggests that entry in an oligopolistic industry reduces market 
power of existing firms and thereby reduces price-cost margins and improves consumer 
welfare1. The aforesaid partial equilibrium result holds good in a general equilibrium 
situation as well (Barua and Pant, 1995). Considering an open economy Cournot model, 
Agarwal and Barua (2004) have shown that the limiting case of entry in such a model 
confirms a competitive outcome.  
 
In the aftermath of the WTO induced liberalization policies of trade and foreign 
direct investment, much attention has been drawn to the debate whether entry has 
significantly affected the market structure in the industrial sector of the Indian economy 
or not. The evidence from recent empirical studies in this area is found to be ambiguous2. 
In a recent analysis on the theory and evidence of market power in Indian manufacturing, 
Das and Pant (2006) have argued that “the new industrial policy has not been able to 
foster competition”3, confirming the earlier findings by a number of researchers4.  
 
One limitation of the existing empirical studies on India using firm-level data is 
however their dependence on more than one source of rather unrelated data for estimating 
the price-cost margins in industries5. This raises doubt as regards the reliability and also 
comparability of their estimates. The present study is an attempt to provide a unified 
                                                 
1  See, Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), p. 412. 
2  For instance, studies by Athreye and Kapur (2003), Kambhampati and Kattuman (2003), and Barua 
and Chakraborty (2006) have observed decline in industrial concentration in India during the post-
liberalization period. However, the findings on price-cost margins are conflicting. While Krishna and 
Mitra (1998) observed significant decline in price-cost margins immediately after the post-
liberalization period, Srivastava et al (2001), Balakrishnan and Babu (2003), Goldar et al (2004), and 
Kambhampati and Parikh (2003) observed rising price-cost margins in Indian industries. 
3  Das and Pant (2006), p. 75. 
4  See note 2. 
5  Firm data provided by the PROWESS database do not provide any information on quantity of output 
produced or quantity of labor used for production by firm. As a result, researchers depend largely on 
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) data for some proxy estimates of labor (wage rate) or output. 
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model of measurement of price-cost margins using the same source of data. In addition, it 
intends to observe the relationship between firm size, marginal cost structure and exports.        
 
The basic theoretical model underlying the current empirical exercise is based on 
the segmented market hypothesis as put forward in a series of papers by Agarwal and 
Barua (1993; 1994; 2004). The main arguments of these papers are that entry 
liberalization (whether internal or external) would result in (a) increase in aggregate 
exports, (b) reduction in industrial concentration, (c) decrease in price-cost margin, and 
(d) increase in social welfare. It is immaterial whether the firms are of domestic or 
foreign origin. Thus, the ongoing WTO induced reforms (external liberalization) and the 
reforms carried out in India since 1991 (internal industrial liberalization) are expected to 
significantly affect the performance of the manufacturing sector of Indian economy 
(Kambhapati and Parikh, 2005).  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the basic theoretical model 
to provide empirically testable propositions of the effects of entry liberalization on 
market performance. A review of the literature is provided in Section III and in Section 
IV we propose an econometric estimation model to test the propositions described in 
Section II. Analysis of the econometric estimation results as well as other findings is 
provided in Section V. Section VI draws a few policy conclusions based on the current 
analysis.   
 
II.  The Model 
 The basic model used here assumes that the firm behaves like a discriminating 
oligopolist as between domestic and foreign markets. The variables used in the analysis 
are defined as follows:  
V.1.  ix is the output of the ith firm;  
V.2.  N is the number of active firms;  
V.3.  X is the industry output, i.e., X =  ix , i = 1,……… N;            
V.4.  idq is the domestic sales of the i
th firm;  
V.5.  Qd is the total domestic demand, i.e., Qd =  idq , i =1, ….  N;  
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V.6.  f (Qd) is the inverse demand function in the domestic market;  
V.7.  Pf is the international price;  
V.8.  ifq is the export of the i
th firm, where xi = idq + 
i
fq , i = 1 ….N;   
V.9.  Qf is the aggregate exports of the country, i.e. Qf =  ifq , i = 1 ….N;  
V.10.  Q-i is  jdq j for j =1,…. N; i    j.  
                      
The following assumptions are made in the current context:  
 
A.1.  the inverse demand function f (Qd) is twice continuously differentiable and 
f ' < 0.  
A.2.  the cost function of the ith firm C (xi) is twice continuously differentiable 
and C (0) = 0 implying that firm can freely exit from the market by 
producing a zero output. Further, the average cost, AC, is strictly U-
shaped with minimum attained at x* where x* > 0.  
A.3.  The profit function for the ith firm (i = 1,…..N)  
 
                                        )(.).( iff
i
dd
i xCqPqQf      [1] 
 
A.4.  Profit maximization under Cournot assumptions gives the first-order 
conditions:  
 
.,0)(')()('. ixCQfQfq
q
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i
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d
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The profit function is assumed to be strictly concave in idq and  
i
fq , so that, 
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And the Hessian, H, is negative definite, that is,  
 
    )(")(")(".)('. iiddd
i xCxCQfqQf         [6]  
 
 We further assume that the country is too small to be able to influence the world 
price so that it behaves in the international market as a price taker. The domestic market 
is however segmented by tariff policies so that no imports occur, and the domestic 
oligopoly exists independently of the world economy. Each firm, therefore, behaves as an 
oligopolist in the domestic market and a perfect competitor in the world market, and 
maximizes profits as a discriminating oligopolist.  
 
Given the first-order conditions [2] and [3], it is possible to derive some important 
empirically testable propositions about market performance and competitiveness. The 
first two propositions relate to firm size, firm cost conditions and export to total turnover 
ratios. Thus, 
 
P1:  If the marginal costs of the firms are identical then it follows from [2] that 
all firms will produce the same level of output which implies that export 
shares6 of firms would also be the same. But if the marginal costs differ, 
the more efficient firm will produce larger volume of output although the 
domestic sales of the firms will be equal irrespective of the costs 
conditions by [2] and [3] above7. This can be verified for any pair of firms 
i and j from the equations [2] and [3] as follows: 
 
)('.)()(')(')('.)( d
j
dd
j
f
i
d
i
dd QfqQfxCPxCQfqQf             [7] 
 
This implies that if marginal costs, )(')(' ji xCxC  , then the above equality is 
maintained at different levels of output. That is, ji xx  if )(')(' ji xCxC  or vise versa 
                                                 
6  Export share is defined as i
i
f
x
q
for the ith firm. Thus, j
j
f
i
i
f
x
q
x
q  if ji xx  .  
7  This is true for all firms exporting. If however, some firms are not exporting but only sell in the 
domestic market then equation [3] is redundant and therefore for a non-exporting pair of firms i and j, 
j
d
i
d qq  . 
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and if )(')(' ji xCxC  , then ji xx  . However, jdid qq  , irrespective of the cost 
conditions by [2] and [3]. 
 
P 2:  The larger (smaller) firm sells a smaller (larger) share of its output in the 
domestic market8. As a corollary, the larger (smaller) firm sells a larger 
(smaller) share of its output in the export market9. Thus, firm size and 
export to total turnover ratios are positively related. 
  
Now, a few propositions relating the effects of entry on firm output, industrial 
concentration, price-cost margins and profitability and consumer welfare are considered 
below.  
  
P 3:  As entry occurs, provided the second order-conditions of profit 
maximization is satisfied, the firm output will be unaffected since the 
world price is given (condition [3] above). 
P 4:  Entry of firms implies that the firm’s share in the domestic market 
declines (thus industry concentration falls) and therefore the firm’s export 
share rises. However, aggregate domestic sales rise with the entry of firms 
leading to a fall in prices and therefore increase in consumer welfare.  
P 5:  As entry of firms occurs in the industry, in the limiting case price 
converges to marginal cost10. Thus, entry leads to decline in the price-cost 
margins. 
 
                                                 
8  If )(')(' ji xCxC  then ji xx  , that is, firm i is larger then firm j; but since jdid qq  by [2] and 
[3], j
j
d
i
i
d
x
q
x
q  .  
9  Suppose iif
i
d xqq  and jjfjd xqq  so that 1 i
i
f
i
i
d
x
q
x
q
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j
f
j
j
d
x
q
x
q
. Then, if ji xx  , 
in that case, given jd
i
d qq  , j
j
d
i
i
d
x
q
x
q  and hence j
j
f
i
i
f
x
q
x
q  .        
10    See Agarwal and Barua (2004). 
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III.  Review of Empirical Literature 
 
There exist a number of studies that attempt to examine the state of competition 
and competitiveness in Indian industries as a consequence of entry liberalization policies 
followed in India since 1991. Several studies conducted during the pre-liberalization 
period showed that concentration ratios had been quite high in India owing to various 
factors, including both economic as well as policy-driven ones (Monopoly Inquiry 
Commission, 1966; Gupta, 1968; Ghosh, 1974, 1975; Sandesara, 1979; Sawhney and 
Swahney, 1974; Katrak, 1980; Apte and Vaidyanathan, 1982).11 On the other hand, 
recent studies with large and medium sized firms note decline in concentration ratios 
during the post-liberalization period (Athreye and Kapur, 2003; Kambhampati and 
Kattuman, 2003; Barua and Chakraborty, 2006).  
 
On the issue of price-cost margins, earlier studies before liberalization have 
generally revealed a positive relationship between price-cost margin (PCM) and 
industrial concentration trends (Sawhney et al, 1973; Rao, 2001). It is also observed that 
industries exhibit higher values of PCM if import competition in those industries is 
relatively low but export orientation is high and has high levels of protection (Katrak, 
1980). However, while the evidence of a significant decline in PCM for several industries 
was noted immediately after liberalization (Krishna and Mitra, 1998), more recent studies 
revealed an increase in the PCM for several industries (Srivastava et al, 2001; 
Balakrishnan and Babu, 2003; Goldar et al, 2004; Das and Pant, 2006). Different 
explanations are offered to explain this phenomenon. For instance, Kambhampati and 
Parikh (2003) explained rising PCM in terms of export intensity of a sector, that is, 
higher the export to sales ratios observed in an industry, higher is also the PCM for those 
industries12. On the other hand, Goldar et al (2004) cited the declining share of labour in 
                                                 
11  The studies broadly agreed over the fact that profitability is higher in industries with higher 
concentration ratios. “.. the margins are higher in industries with relatively little import competition, 
high export orientation and high rates of protection.” Katrak (1980), p. 75. However, Apte and 
Vaidyanathan (1982) concluded that nature of licensing controls across industries does not affect 
performance in a significant manner. 
12  This is possible if exporting leads to fall in excess capacities of firms. However, this is unlikely as it 
violates the second-order condition of profit maximization. As shown by Agarwal and Barua (1994), 
for a price taking firm selling in export and domestic markets, the equilibrium always takes place on 
the rising segment of the cost function. Focusing on the determinants of PCMs for OECD countries 
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The value-added as a major factor behind rising PCM13. Das and Pant (2006) argued that 
entry liberalization did not lead to the expansion of the middle-sized firms but instead it 
had led to expansion of firms at the lower end of the spectrum. In their leadership model, 
such expansion of the tiny firms could not significantly affect the dominance of the leader 
firms in the industries. 
 
The empirical studies discussed above however have certain limitations. First, the 
empirical analysis undertaken in several studies are not supported by any rigorous 
theoretical framework, barring the exception of Das and Pant (2006). Second, even where 
theoretical model is present such as in Das and Pant (2006), the underlying model is set 
up in a purely closed economy framework and therefore the model is incapable of 
considering the impact of trade. Third, some of the above-mentioned studies often derive 
a concordance and use the firm balance sheet data (PROWESS) as well as aggregate 
industry data (Annual Survey of Industries, ASI) since the balance sheet data do not 
provide information on output or labour. However, the two sources of data are otherwise 
quite unrelated and hence the reliability of the estimates and their comparability with 
each other are questionable. Fourth, domestic firms may also undergo dynamic technical 
changes under the pressure of entry of efficient foreign firms. As a result, a rise in PCM 
may be associated with a fall in prices as well provided the reductions in costs are more 
that proportionate of the fall in prices. The effect has not been adequately addressed in 
the existing literature.   
 
The present study intends to provide a unified model of estimating the level of 
concentration, price-cost margins and exports, which is an attempt to bridge the gap in 
existing literature. Based on the open economy oligopoly model as discussed in Section I, 
the demand and cost functions are parameterized for the econometric estimation of price-
cost margin and the elasticity of demand. The advantage of the unified model is that it 
can estimate all relevant measures of market performance by using a single data source 
                                                                                                                                                 
between 1970-2003, Boulhol (2005) explained the rising trend by financial market development, 
capital mobility and the weakening of workers’ bargaining power.  
13  The weakness of this argument lies on the fact that a decline in the share of labour and therefore a rise 
in the share of capital would result from a relative decline in the rate of return on capital and a rise in 
the wage rates. But by itself this does not ensure any increase in profitability. 
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and able to show the inter-linkages between concentration, price-cost margins and 
exports in terms of the model.  
 
IV.  Data Source and Methodology 
 
a. Data 
 
The PROWESS data (CMIE) provides most of the information that is required for 
the testing of the propositions as put forward in Section II above. For example, 
PROWESS provides data on firm level total turnover (sales) and its decomposition into 
domestic and exports sales. These data are classified according to the industry code. 
Thus, it is possible to test propositions P1 and P2 relating to exports intensity and firm 
size and also marginal costs.  
     
Fourteen sectors14 from 1990 to 2008 are considered for the analysis which 
provides the scope for a fair comparison of the current observations with pre-
liberalization and pre-WTO accession period scenario. The selection of industries has 
been based on two criteria, one, a moderate share in India’s export basket (roughly more 
than 0.8 percent) and two, relatively higher values of the Intra-Industry Trade index. The 
detail data on firm-level entry scenario across the sectors is provided in Table 1. It is 
observed that the number of firms has shown a consistent increase over the sample 
period. 
 
It is observed from Table 2 that the overall importance of the selected sectors in 
India’s export basket has declined from 65.34 percent in 1996-97 to 57.94 percent in 
2008-09. However, a closer analysis reveals that the decline is owing to the performance 
of textile and garments, leather and rubber sector, while all other sectors are witnessing 
proportional increase in India’s export basket. Table 3 shows the firm-level outward 
orientation (captured by average export-sales ratio) of the selected sectors, which reveals 
that export intensity has increased over the period.  
 
                                                 
14  The selected sectors include: automobile, chemical, electrical, electronics, garments, gems and jewelry, 
leather, machinery, pharmaceuticals, plastic, rubber, steel, textile and transport equipments. 
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The methodology adopted in the empirical estimation is discussed briefly in the 
following section. 
 
b. Methodology and the underlying Model 
 
For the purpose of estimation of price-cost margins and export intensity from the 
firm level data, it is required to parameterize the inverse demand function assumed in A1. 
Therefore, an iso-elastic demand function as defined by [8] below is considered here to 
relate domestic price and quantity demanded at any given point in time.15 This demand 
function is further assumed to be time invariant. 
 dD PAQ .      [8]    
In equation [8], Pd denotes the domestic price, QD is defined as the aggregate 
domestic demand and ε is the elasticity of demand. It is assumed that the firms belonging 
to an industry produce a homogenous product and all active firms play Cournot 
competition. Thus, in equilibrium all firms face the same price. It is also assumed that the 
domestic market is segmented from the world market and that the firms differ in their 
cost structures. From the first-order maximization condition of profit maximization 
subject to the demand function [8], the price-cost margin for each firm as a percentage of 
the price is derived in the following manner:  

i
d
id s
P
cP  )'(     [9] 
where c’i is the marginal cost and si16 is the share of the ith firm in the domestic market 
demand and  is the elasticity of demand, which is constant. 
 
If firms are also engaged in export then the division of output between domestic 
market and export is determined by the conditions [2] and [3] simultaneously. But the 
firm output is determined by the marginal cost conditions and the foreign price (see 
footnote 7), the firm output is unaffected by entry as long as the foreign price is infinitely 
                                                 
15  The assumption of the iso-elastic demand function is not necessary for the analysis. It is assumed here 
for simplicity.  
16  
d
i
d
i Q
qs  , where Qd is the aggregate domestic demand. 
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elastic as assumed in our model. Therefore, Proposition P1 and Proposition P2 above 
describe the relationship between sharing of output between domestic market and export 
market, given the firm cost conditions. For instance, if marginal costs differ across firms 
and the firms do not export, then the equilibrium of the industry is shown with Diagram 
1, where Pd is the equilibrium price, QD is the aggregate market demand and c* is the 
marginal cost of the most efficient firm.  
 
The diagram represents the standard closed economy situation. The length of the 
horizontal step gives the amount that each firm sells in the market and the vertical 
distance between the steps represents the differences between the marginal costs of a firm 
with respect to the most efficient firm. If the most efficient firm were to supply the entire 
market, then the market equilibrium would have been at D, and the price charged would 
have been c*. Therefore, the loss in consumer surplus as a result of equilibrium price 
being above c* is the area given by the region ABCD. The shaded area, ignoring fixed 
costs, measures the firm’s profits. However, if the firms also export then by Proposition 
P2, it is obtained that the domestic sales of the firms must be the same irrespective of the 
cost conditions and hence the diagram below does not depict the case when firms are 
exporting. 
 
Diagram 1: Equilibrium of the Industry when firms do not export 
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If there is information on the market shares of each firm and the elasticity of 
demand, then from equation [2] it is possible to estimate the price-cost margin as a 
percentage of prices for each firm. But while from PROWESS data it is possible to have 
information on si, no information on firm marginal cost is available. Hence for the 
estimation, equation [2] is rewritten by summing up across all firms which gives us the 
following expression: 
 
 c
n
Pd 


  
11       [10] 
      
Thus, if we have the information about the elasticity of demand and the number of 
firms then we can estimate the price cost margin from [10]. Unfortunately, we do not 
have sufficient information to estimate the elasticity of demand from [10] as it requires 
data on price and quantity demanded. Similarly, it is not possible to estimate the cost 
function since PROWESS data does not provide the figures representing the quantity of 
output being sold by the firms. However, PROWESS data provide the sales by firms in 
both domestic and export markets separately17. Now, consider the total sales of the ith 
firm si, as consisting of  
f
if
d
idi qPqPS        [11] 
where both Pd and Pf are the same across all firms at the point of equilibrium. If 
the domestic average tariff rate in the industry is t, then the following relationship is 
obtained, 
    )1(. tPP fd        [12] 
In other words, value of exports can be expressed in domestic price using 
equation [12]. For determining tariff rate, the current analysis sources the relevant data 
points at HS 6-digit level for the selected industries from the various annual volumes of 
customs tariff handbook and the mean tariffs constructed in this manner are used. The 
iS constructed in this manner is symbolized as 
*
iS from now on.  
                                                 
17  In this paper we shall try to estimate the cost function from the sales data assuming a iso-elastic cost 
function. 
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)1(* tqPqPS fif
d
idi       [13] 
Expressing equation [13] in domestic prices alone, we have:  
)(* fi
d
idi qqPS        [14] 
Since all firms face the same price, therefore, *iS  may be treated as output of a 
firm multiplied by some constant. Summing over all firms from equation [14] we get: 
 XPS d*        [15] 
We assume that the cost function of a firm is iso-elastic in output, i.e., 

ii xC         [16] 
We use *iS in the place of xi as we cannot observe the quantities directly. For 
regression purpose, equation [16] can be written in the following form: 
iii SC   *lnln       [17] 
 Here the error term i  is not connoted with log terms, because it is taken as a 
multiplicative factor in the original equation. Now from equation [17],   can be 
estimated and hence the total output X can be derived from equation [16] in the following 
manner: 

1
ii Cx         [18] 
 Therefore, the industry output is henceforth represented by:  
 ixX         [19] 
Given the industry sales as in equation [15], dividing equation [15] by equation 
[19], the estimated industry price is obtained.   
 
Now, the firm output that is estimated can be used for estimating marginal cost in 
the following manner: 
iii exC         [20] 
 
Estimating equation [20], the values of  could be obtained. It is clear that from 
estimated marginal cost and industry price, PCM can be calculated by considering only 
the data from PROWESS database. Similarly the elasticity of demand can be determined 
with the same set of data from equation [10].  
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V.  Results 
 
 With trade liberalization, the monopoly power of the firms in the industry is 
expected to decline, leading to (1) reduction in industry concentration, which in turn is 
expected to lead to a (2) decline in the price-cost margin of the industry. Further, increase 
in number of firms within an industry due to entry liberalization is likely to result an (3) 
increase in the elasticity of the domestic demand curve since more firms implies 
availability of greater number of varieties for the consumer.18 The validity of these 
hypotheses is tested in the Indian context. The empirical estimates of industry 
concentration levels, price-cost margins, elasticity of demand and importance of size 
variable on export behaviour are provided below. 
 
A.  The Concentration Measures 
  
The Herfindahl index for overall sales for select years is presented in Table 4. An 
overall decline is witnessed, barring certain sector specific exceptions. For instance, gems 
and jewelry, leather, textile etc. has witnessed decline in concentration in general. 
However, automobile and transport sector has witnessed increase in concentration during 
1990-95. During 1995-00, a similar trend has been noticed in chemical, non-electrical 
machinery, rubber and textile. During 2000-05, several sectors like automobile, electrical, 
electronics, garments, pharmaceuticals, plastic, rubber, transport etc. revealed rising 
concentration trends. This signifies the importance of entry, both by foreign-origin as 
well as domestic ones since 1991, with the foreign firms playing a key role in several 
sectors.19 However, while the concentration ratio has undergone a change, interestingly 
the relative positions of the major players have not. 
 
                                                 
18  Chemberlin (1969) argues that, “.. the larger the number of sellers in the market, the greater the 
elasticity of demand for each seller.” p. 282. However, we are not referring to the market demand 
function for each seller, but the aggregate demand function, which can be derived from the underlying 
equilibrium condition. Therefore, any change in elasticity may be the result of the change in the 
parameter of the utility function, which essentially means a change in the utility function itself.  
19  Redington (India) Ltd Novartis India Ltd., G E Plastics India Ltd. and Bata India Ltd. in electronics, 
pharmaceuticals, plastics and leather sector respectively could be cited here. But the transition has been 
strongest in transport sector, where a number of foreign firms, namely – Maruti Udyog Ltd., Hyundai 
Motor India Ltd., Motor Industries Co. Ltd., Daewoo Motors India Ltd., Ford India Ltd. etc. remain 
among the key players.  
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The above-mentioned point can be proved with the help of Table 5, which counts 
the number of common market leaders between two periods.20 It is observed that most of 
the sectors have witnessed compositional change after liberalization, and newer industry 
leaders have emerged. The rate of the change has however varied across sectors. For 
instance, in sectors like automobile, textile and rubber several firms dominate the 
industry in 2005, who have retained their position since 1990. On the other hand, in 
sectors like leather, pharmaceuticals and plastic, a completely new set of industry leaders 
have emerged in 2005, indicating efficiency gains by the newcomers / erstwhile marginal 
players. Interestingly, the relative stability for the export market is found to be lower as 
compared to the domestic market, which signifies greater competition in the external 
market.   
 
B.  The Price-Cost Margin (PCM)  
 
Before going to the PCM analysis, the role of foreign presence in the Indian 
market needs to be understood with the help of Tables 6 and 7, which analyzes foreign 
presence in domestic and foreign market respectively.21 It is observed from Table 6 that 
over the years foreign presence has increased for automobile, electrical, electronics, iron 
and steel, leather, non-electrical machinery, plastic and transport equipments, but 
decreased for chemicals, garments, pharmaceuticals, rubber, textile etc. In case of export 
sales, Table 7 reveals that while foreign presence increases for automobile, electronics, 
garments, iron and steel, leather, rubber, transport equipments, the same decreases in 
chemicals, electrical, non-electrical machinery, pharmaceuticals, plastic and textile. The 
overall PCM level in a sector has been significantly influenced by the level of foreign 
penetration (i.e., entry and competition) within that sector.  
 
Table 8 provides the estimates of PCM for various industries. A few interesting 
observations can be made. First, a general rise in PCM is observed over 1990 to 1995 
simultaneously with the decline in concentration ratios. Second, several sectors have 
                                                 
20  The interpretation of the number ‘5’ in first row, last column is that, if the exporting firms in the 
automobile sector are ranked according to their value of exports in 1990 and 2005, then there are 5 
common firms among the top ten list.   
21  The foreign owned firms include both private foreign firms as well as firms coming under foreign 
business Groups.  
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shown an increase in PCM over 1995 to 2000 as well (textiles, chemicals, electronics, 
iron and steel, pharmaceutical etc.). Third, an increase in PCM is noticed for several 
categories over 2000 to 2005 as well (electrical, electronics, garments, leather etc.). A 
declining trend in the last reported year 2008 has been observed, which may be explained 
by the decline in the number of reported firms.22 While at the first sight this finding 
appears to be a bit inconsistent, a little introspection reveals that such a possibility may 
arise if more efficient firms, particularly foreign firms, enter the industry after the 
liberalization. Alternatively, spillover of technical changes across all firms as a result of 
increased pressure of competition due to liberalization may explain this scenario.23  
 
C. Elasticity Trends  
 
The elasticity estimates for the selected are shown in Table 9. It is observed that 
the demand curve is generally inelastic, barring the exception of automobile in 1993, 
gems and jewelry in 1991, leather in 1992 and rubber in 1990, 1991 and 1994. The 
comparison between the two end years, 1990 and 2008 reveals that the value of elasticity 
has declined over the period. In case of some industries (electrical, leather, non-electrical 
machinery), elasticity increased over 1995 to 2000, but declined in the following period.  
 
D.  Firm Size and Exports   
 
Given the considerable increase in the number of exporting firms, the overall 
export-sales ratio of the industries has also increased.24 In our next step, we examine the 
validity of the relationship between firm size and export intensity as propose in 
Proposition 1 & 2.25  The results for the 14 industries chosen on the basis of their 
importance in India’s export basket are summarized in Table 10. It is observed from the 
correlation coefficients that the relationship between the size of the firms and their export 
                                                 
22  The decline is caused by incomplete updating of the firm data by PROWESS, rather than actual exit of 
firms.  
23  A higher PCM for the foreign firms can be explained by the higher average productivity growth of the 
foreign-affiliated firms vis-à-vis the domestic firms (Banga, 2003). 
24  It is observed from the fitted curves that barring the exception automobile and chemical, where export 
intensity has marginally declined, in all other sectors the intensity has increased in the post-1995 
period. 
25  For the relationship between firm size and export, we consider total assets in a particular year as a 
suitable proxy of firm size. 
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volume is significantly positive in all cases supporting the Proposition P 2 above that 
larger firms usually tend to export more, though the degree differed across the sectors. 
This result is in line with the industry-level analysis of Barua and Chakraborty (2004). 
Further support to the result comes from Melitz model (2003), which argued that 
exposure to trade induce only the more productive firms to enter the export market. This 
result holds good in the Indian scenario as well (Kumar and Pradhan, 2007).  
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
The current analysis focuses on the effects of increased market access due to entry 
liberalization policies on India’s exports and industrial performance. India’s trade 
expansion during the post-reform period has been consistent with the standard HOS 
theory of trade, without any drastic reallocation of resources in the industrial sector. This 
is possible in a monopolistic market structure where trade liberalization may lead to 
increase in the size of the exporting firms’ production and a decline in the level of 
production of the import-competing firms and also if domestic market is segmented by 
high domestic tariffs in comparison to the world tariffs.  
 
 The analysis under an oligopolistic market framework shows that liberalization 
has led to a lowering of the concentration ratio and a rise in the PCM in general. The 
coexistence of the rise in PCM, despite declining concentration can be explained by the 
fact that the cost structure of the firms might have declined more significantly as 
compared to the decline in market power. In addition, the elasticity of demand did not 
show any significant change, barring certain exceptions. The inelastic point of the 
demand curve in equilibrium is also responsible for the rise in PCM. Finally, the size of 
the firms and their export volume is found to be positively related, indicating better 
performance of the export-oriented firms on the external front.  
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Table 1: Number of Firms included in the analysis 
  
  Number of firms 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
1 Automobiles 19 22 28 24 27 
2 Chemicals 260 674 760 859 675 
3 Electrical 101 203 218 243 207 
4 Electronics 76 275 517 692 548 
5 Garments 9 49 76 101 84 
6 Gems & Jewelry 6 44 57 86 59 
7 Iron & Steel 159 402 499 525 452 
8 Leather 7 49 47 62 42 
9 Non-Electrical Machinery 126 227 245 295 237 
10 Pharma 79 245 283 333 271 
11 Plastic 51 224 262 295 221 
12 Rubber 26 65 74 106 74 
13 Textiles 241 585 593 674 617 
14 Transport 106 202 330 320 282 
 
 
 
Table 2: Importance of Selected Sectors in India’s Overall Export Basket (%) 
 
 
 Sectors 1996-97 2000-01  2002-04 2004-05  2008-09 
1 Automobile / Transport 2.69 2.09 2.13 2.95 3.27
2 Chemical  3.67 4.41 4.76 5.10 4.67
3 Machinery and Equipment 5.69 6.11 6.02 6.44 9.54
4 Pharmaceuticals 2.01 2.12 2.66 2.47 2.78
5 Cotton Textiles 13.93 10.88 9.20 6.91 4.45
6 Garments 13.44 15.10 13.29 10.23 7.28
7 Gems and Jewelry 14.26 16.67 17.25 17.28 15.32
8 Iron and Steel 4.19 4.83 5.82 7.82 7.15
9 Leather 3.25 3.14 2.51 2.02 1.26
10 Plastic 1.20 1.57 1.90 2.52 1.37
11 Rubber 1.01 0.81 1.00 0.91 0.84
 Total 65.34 67.73 66.54 64.64 57.94
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Table 3: Export-Orientation Trends of Selected Firms (%) 
 
 Industry 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
1 Automobiles 3.77 7.23 4.20 7.59 9.35
2 Chemicals 4.52 7.83 9.94 15.69 18.32
3 Electrical 4.77 4.64 4.53 6.79 6.96
4 Electronics 3.79 4.05 5.26 5.31 3.99
5 Garments 61.04 48.50 54.18 55.34 45.40
6 Gems & Jewelry 67.72 74.64 70.77 82.34 77.21
7 Iron & Steel 3.04 7.69 9.49 14.62 14.11
8 Leather 38.26 39.07 35.58 40.30 39.76
9 Non-Electrical Machinery 4.34 5.72 6.40 9.78 10.98
10 Pharmaceuticals 7.87 13.71 18.33 30.06 34.43
11 Plastic 2.57 6.20 8.16 19.02 16.47
12 Rubber 5.85 9.46 7.69 13.29 14.67
13 Textiles 5.86 15.34 20.04 22.47 24.54
14 Transport 3.69 6.56 4.81 8.03 9.68
 
 
 
Table 4: Harfindahl index Trends in industries (Overall Sales) 
 
  HHI 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
1 Automobiles 0.151 0.189 0.122 0.133 0.134 
2 Chemicals 0.019 0.013 0.019 0.014 0.015 
3 Electrical 0.029 0.023 0.023 0.027 0.033 
4 Electronics 0.083 0.035 0.024 0.036 0.049 
5 Garments 0.208 0.047 0.044 0.058 0.052 
6 Gems & Jewelry 0.253 0.113 0.095 0.085 0.128 
7 Iron & Steel 0.206 0.118 0.080 0.061 0.050 
8 Leather 0.530 0.150 0.144 0.096 0.104 
9 Non-Electrical Machinery 0.101 0.057 0.071 0.056 0.072 
10 Pharma 0.030 0.019 0.018 0.023 0.022 
11 Plastic 0.188 0.110 0.088 0.103 0.064 
12 Rubber 0.100 0.089 0.109 0.115 0.134 
13 Textiles 0.016 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 
14 Transport 0.074 0.079 0.051 0.055 0.056 
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Table 5: Relative Stability in Market Structure: Presence of top 10 Firms (Number) 
 
1990 and 1995 1990 and 2000 1990 and 2005  Sectors 
Domestic Export Domestic Export Domestic Export
1 Automobiles 7 6 7 6 7 5 
2 Chemicals 5 4 6 4 5 2 
3 Electrical 5 4 5 4 6 3 
4 Electronics 7 5 7 1 4 3 
5 Garments - - 4 2 1 2 
6 Gems and Jewelry - - 5 5 3 4 
7 Iron & Steel 7 4 5 2 2 2 
8 Leather - - 5 4 4 0 
9 Non-Electrical 
Machinery 
9 6 7 5 6 4 
10 Pharmaceuticals 7 2 0 0 1 0 
11 Plastic 6 3 5 1 4 1 
12 Rubber 10 7 7 5 5 4 
13 Textiles 6 6 5 3 3 2 
14 Transport 8 5 6 7 6 6 
 
 
Table 6: Foreign Presence in Domestic Sales (%) 
 
 Sectors 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
1 Automobiles 18.61 25.05 37.09 36.29 31.81 
2 Chemicals 29.68 24.57 27.96 23.81 21.87 
3 Electrical 28.16 22.76 23.43 27.33 29.39 
4 Electronics 11.65 15.43 20.91 25.29 17.70 
5 Garments 2.09 1.92 1.85 0.40 1.92 
6 Iron & Steel 0.47 1.23 1.59 1.32 0.94 
7 Leather 17.46 35.11 32.09 21.90 23.85 
8 Non-Electrical Machinery 13.85 17.20 17.87 21.13 18.89 
9 Pharmaceuticals 49.05 35.51 28.25 24.68 16.99 
10 Plastic 4.50 3.74 4.54 4.68 6.15 
11 Rubber 5.94 5.21 8.38 5.21 4.86 
12 Textiles 3.03 2.17 2.31 0.74 0.37 
13 Transport 16.78 20.66 27.39 28.01 25.98 
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Table 7: Foreign Presence in Export Sales (%) 
 
 Sectors 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
1 Automobiles 15.79 26.87 35.58 53.02 35.83 
2 Chemicals 47.52 30.88 32.40 25.49 18.98 
3 Electrical 32.51 44.03 40.46 36.43 31.87 
4 Electronics 4.90 13.36 38.71 51.67 43.05 
5 Garments 0.00 0.34 2.72 0.26 2.59 
6 Iron & Steel 0.56 1.36 2.53 1.53 0.99 
7 Leather 3.91 4.06 2.71 6.89 4.84 
8 Non-Electrical Machinery 36.83 25.70 38.17 38.98 29.91 
9 Pharmaceuticals 46.98 27.90 24.89 26.05 16.36 
10 Plastic 18.66 3.98 3.90 3.40 5.82 
11 Rubber 0.67 4.15 2.19 5.29 2.22 
12 Textiles 8.34 2.92 1.77 0.84 0.65 
13 Transport 17.32 25.91 28.32 39.34 28.78 
 
 
 
 25
Table 8: The Price Cost Margin Results in the Market Segments – Industry-wise 
 
(Percentage) 
Industry 
Automobile
s Chemicals Electrical 
Electron
ics 
Garme
nts 
Gems 
& 
Jewelri
es 
Iron 
& 
Steel 
Leathe
r 
Non-
Electrical 
Machine
ry 
Pharmaceutica
ls 
Plasti
c 
Rubb
er 
Textil
es Transport 
1990 0.126 0.062 0.104 0.041 - - 0.137 - 0.041 0.197 0.197 0.015 0.087 0.091 
1991 0.124 0.129 0.175 0.060 0.213 0.086 0.135   0.019 0.212 0.222 0.017 0.295 0.071 
1992 0.337 0.058 0.177 0.147 0.138 0.222 0.010 0.043 0.054 0.039 0.228 0.039 0.105 0.177 
1993 0.043 0.112 0.222 0.105 0.174 0.211 0.082 0.068 0.083 0.108 0.083 0.012 0.107 0.117 
1994 0.118 0.143 0.142 0.263 0.188 0.293 0.165 0.267 0.271 0.084 0.379 
-
0.007 0.165 0.134 
1995 0.247 0.159 0.158 0.160 0.334 0.244 0.289 0.288 0.218 0.225 0.225 0.062 0.188 0.183 
1996 0.164 0.191 0.165 0.157 0.330 0.233 0.147 0.366 0.153 0.198 0.299 0.035 0.174 0.203 
1997 0.220 0.322 0.111 0.178 0.185 0.249 0.228 0.337 0.171 0.212 0.248 0.091 0.205 0.156 
1998 0.225 0.318 0.017 0.245 0.224 0.184 0.266 0.602 0.113 0.300 0.339 0.021 0.181 0.226 
1999 0.169 0.352 0.075 0.222 0.446 0.248 0.319 0.634 0.177 0.219 0.373 0.044 0.293 0.199 
2000 0.188 0.343 0.093 0.212 0.283 0.229 0.392 0.287 0.161 0.451 0.451 0.093 0.397 0.304 
2001 0.136 0.315 0.135 0.228 0.283 0.260 0.336 0.455 0.200 0.236 0.398 0.070 0.293 0.175 
2002 0.101 0.348 0.085 0.254 0.306 0.243 0.298 0.373 0.238 0.300 0.428 0.077 0.345 0.232 
2003 0.142 0.305 0.105 0.235 0.306 0.244 0.349 0.402 0.295 0.297 0.332 0.038 0.294 0.185 
2004 0.130 0.300 0.100 0.220 0.342 0.271 0.327 0.397 0.234 0.278 0.327 0.109 0.300 0.245 
2005 0.134 0.303 0.139 0.226 0.366 0.245 0.325 0.443 0.180 0.318 0.318 0.081 0.270 0.278 
2006 0.134 0.294 0.254 0.253 0.326 0.240 0.272 0.444 0.224 0.212 0.360 0.052 0.294 0.212 
2007 0.100 0.272 0.197 0.265 0.187 0.189 0.234 0.273 0.237 0.239 0.425 0.124 0.262 0.108 
2008 0.096 0.278 0.200 0.235 0.243 0.151 0.280 0.177 0.165 0.216 0.315 0.110 0.237 0.180 
Source: Calculated by authors 
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Table 9: Elasticity Results in the Market Segments – Industry-wise 
 
(Percentage) 
Industry 
Automobile
s Chemicals Electrical 
Electron
ics 
Garme
nts 
Gems 
& 
Jewlleri
es 
Iron 
& 
Steel 
Leathe
r 
Non-
Electrical 
Machine
ry 
Pharmaceutica
ls 
Plasti
c 
Rubb
er 
Textil
es Transport 
1990 0.417 0.062 0.095 0.318 - - 0.046 - 0.192 0.064 0.099 2.609 0.048 0.103 
1991 0.426 0.024 0.049 0.164 0.391 1.291 0.038   0.344 0.047 0.059 1.898 0.011 0.108 
1992 0.156 0.048 0.045 0.065 0.454 0.409 0.406 2.312 0.103 0.216 0.052 0.712 0.027 0.039 
1993 1.119 0.020 0.032 0.067 0.319 0.316 0.047 0.863 0.060 0.063 0.110 1.790 0.023 0.049 
1994 0.404 0.013 0.038 0.018 0.166 0.114 0.018 0.110 0.018 0.062 0.016 
-
2.642 0.011 0.038 
1995 0.184 0.009 0.031 0.023 0.061 0.093 0.009 0.071 0.020 0.018 0.020 0.247 0.009 0.027 
1996 0.265 0.008 0.029 0.021 0.054 0.091 0.018 0.056 0.027 0.019 0.014 0.426 0.009 0.023 
1997 0.198 0.005 0.047 0.018 0.093 0.091 0.012 0.064 0.025 0.020 0.017 0.161 0.008 0.030 
1998 0.185 0.004 0.311 0.012 0.074 0.113 0.010 0.037 0.038 0.013 0.013 0.660 0.009 0.020 
1999 0.228 0.004 0.062 0.010 0.034 0.073 0.007 0.034 0.023 0.016 0.011 0.298 0.005 0.019 
2000 0.190 0.004 0.049 0.009 0.047 0.077 0.005 0.074 0.025 0.008 0.008 0.145 0.004 0.010 
2001 0.284 0.004 0.034 0.008 0.049 0.062 0.006 0.049 0.021 0.015 0.010 0.191 0.005 0.018 
2002 0.368 0.004 0.054 0.007 0.042 0.064 0.007 0.058 0.016 0.012 0.009 0.159 0.004 0.015 
2003 0.293 0.004 0.038 0.006 0.033 0.054 0.006 0.044 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.267 0.004 0.017 
2004 0.285 0.004 0.039 0.006 0.030 0.043 0.006 0.042 0.014 0.010 0.010 0.087 0.004 0.012 
2005 0.298 0.004 0.030 0.006 0.027 0.047 0.006 0.036 0.019 0.009 0.011 0.116 0.005 0.011 
2006 0.248 0.004 0.016 0.006 0.031 0.054 0.007 0.041 0.016 0.014 0.010 0.213 0.004 0.015 
2007 0.333 0.005 0.022 0.006 0.064 0.074 0.008 0.075 0.016 0.013 0.009 0.092 0.005 0.029 
2008 0.386 0.005 0.024 0.008 0.049 0.112 0.008 0.135 0.026 0.017 0.014 0.123 0.007 0.020 
Source: Calculated by authors 
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Table 10: Correlation Coefficients of Marginal Cost, Size and Exports 
 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
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1 Textiles -0.35a -0.56 a 0.43 a -0.11 a -0.15 a 0.53 a -0.03 -0.04 0.48 a -0.07 c -0.08 b 0.49 a -0.07 c -0.05 0.71 a
2 Automobiles -0.24 -0.31 0.96 a -0.19 -0.26 0.93 a -0.14 -0.18 0.84 a -0.14 -0.18 0.73 a -0.36 c -0.29 0.71 a
3 Chemicals -0.33 a -0.54 a 0.41 a -0.13 a -0.19 a 0.51 a -0.03 -0.04 0.64 a -0.06 c -0.07 b 0.37 a -0.06 c -0.05  0.49 a
4 Electrical -0.29 a -0.52 a 0.67 a -0.13 -0.27 a 0.67 a -0.16 -0.27 a 0.58 a -0.12 b -0.16 b 0.77 a -0.12 c -0.09  0.65 a
5 Electronics -0.19c -0.39 a 0.25 b -0.12 b -0.15 0.39 a -0.07 b -0.09 b 0.26 a -0.05 -0.06 c 0.21 a -0.06 -0.04  0.37 a
6 Garments -0.74b -0.64 c 0.25 -0.22 -0.29 b 0.12 c -0.20 c -0.28 b 0.12 -0.06 -0.12 0.06 -0.10 -0.06 0.79 a
7 Gems & Jewelry  - - - -0.25 c -0.24 0.08 -0.23 c -0.13 0.26 b -0.09 -0.07 0.12 -0.31 b -0.27 b 0.96 a
8 Iron & Steel -0.15 -0.12 0.72 a -0.04 -0.03 0.80 a -0.02 c -0.01 0.81 a -0.03 -0.02 0.57 a -0.03 -0.03 0.60 a
9 Leather -  - - -0.17 -0.08 0.04 -0.28 c -0.15 0.11 -0.12 -0.06 0.02 -0.34 b -0.33 b 0.41 a
10 Non-Electrical Machinery -0.47 a -0.40 a 0.29 a -0.09 -0.09 0.55 a -0.12 b -0.12 c 0.67 a -0.11 b -0.10 c 0.80 a -0.16 a -0.13 b 0.54 a
11 Pharma -0.46 a -0.71 a 0.52 a -0.12 b -0.12 b 0.98 a -0.10 c -0.18 a 0.57 a -0.07 -0.13 b 0.64 a -0.16 a -0.10 b 0.90 a
12 Plastic -0.23 c -0.23 c 0.1 -0.11 c -0.08 0.43 a -0.05 -0.03 0.66 a -0.03 -0.03 0.89 a - - 0.87 a
13 Rubber -0.59 a -0.78 a 0.90 a -0.38 a -0.43 a 0.88 a -0.30 a -0.29 b 0.83 a -0.19 b -0.19 c 0.68 a - - 0.66 a
14 Transport -0.11 -0.14 0.89 a -0.11 -0.15 b 0.92 a -0.04 -0.04 0.82 a -0.03 -0.03 0.77 a -0.08 -0.07 0.75 a
 
Note: a, b and c imply level of statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively.  
 
